Phenomenological Skillful Coping
Another Counter-Argument to Daniel Dennett’s Heterophenomenology
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Abstract

This paper deals with Daniel Dennett’s well-known charges against phenomenological philosophy as an endeavour to restore the rights of introspection: that is, the attempt, albeit doomed to failure, to contribute to the science of the mind from a purported incorrigible, ineffable and ‘subjective’ (interpreted as ‘private’) first-person perspective. According to Dennett’s heterophenomenology, only a strict third-person method is possible when it comes to the scientific study of the mind. I will dispute Dennett’s method in order to do both: correct Dennett’s caricaturization of phenomenological philosophy as naïve introspection and offer not only a clarification of phenomenology’s true aims and scope, but also a case in which phenomenology will stand as a crucial option in the new studies of the mind, under the sigh of fresh air that can be found in the new approaches to cognitive science (the so-called 4EA approaches: embodied, embedded, extended, enacted, affective). By way of introducing the concept of ‘phenomenological skillful-coping,’ an affirmative respond to Dennett’s own question shall be given: “Is there anything about experience that is not explorable by heterophenomenology? I’d like to know what.” The answer to Dennett should be firm: Yes there is! No less than the most basic non-theoretical, non-representational, embodied and embedded, human experience or coping.

1. The Case Against Heterophenomenology

Daniel Dennett has defended and explained for many years a research method that he himself admits not having created, but which is arguably to be found — and this according to his own words — in the very practice of cognitive science:

[...] Heterophenomenology is nothing other than the scientific method applied to the phenomena of consciousness, and thus the way to save the rich phenomenology of consciousness for scientific study. I didn't invent the heterophenomenological method; I just codified, more

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self-consciously and carefully than before, the ground rules already tacitly endorsed by the leading researchers” (Dennett 1993, 50).

In his self-presentation for the entry ‘Daniel Dennett’ in Guttenplan’s edited *Companion to the Philosophy of Mind* (cf. 2005, 236-244), he traces his own thinking path spanning from his early attempt (cf. Dennett 1969) at a theory of content, that is, of intentionality and consciousness, which nonetheless — according to his own assessment — only found a satisfactory form in his opus magnum, *Consciousness Explained* (1991).¹

Dennett’s theory of intentionality, along with his well-known eliminativism or ‘metaphysical minimalism’ (cf. Dennett 1982, 159; Zahavi 2007, 37), have gained him the fame of being a heterodox theorist of mind. And one is prone to affirm this fame is well deserved.² His eliminativist radicalism according to which people’s most basic beliefs are to be amounted to nothing less than fiction, for beliefs should be treated indeed as theorist’s fictions (cf. Dennett 2003, 20; a position defended also in Dennett 1971, 1987 and 1991) seems also to indicate the world, and our whole experience thereof, is nothing but a grand illusion.³ The world *seems*, no doubt, as meaningful, as being loaded with all kinds of events which we experience personally, but nothing of that can be stated scientifically, according to Dennett’s absolute cognitivism, before we can match those meaningful events of experience with the ‘real goings-on’ in the brain. That is to say, the personal level of experience has to be matched with subpersonal brain processes or we will be left over with nothing but beliefs and mere opinions. Only then, that is, when we be able to match scientificalaly the gap between the personal and subpersonal levels of human life, we will be consequently in the position to declare that those experiences are more than just autophenomenological beliefs, for what is worth considering as ‘truly real’ is actually just that subpersonal level out of which everything else arises and takes

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¹ “[O]nly in *Consciousness Explained*… was an alternative positive model of consciousness sketched in any detail, the Multiple Drafts model.” Dennett (2005), 242.

² Dennett himself does not seem to be bothered even slightly by the fact that his philosophy of mind were to be contraintuitive or difficult to digest from the layman’s perspective: “I don’t view it as ominous that my theory seems at first to be strongly at odds with common wisdom. On the contrary, we shouldn’t expect a good theory of consciousness to make for comfortable reading” (1991) 37. In fact, he has saluted the fact that his research procedures and philosophical style “have made me a distinctly impure philosopher of mind” (2005), 243.

form. According to Dennett,

[…] If we were to find real goings-on in people’s brain that had enough of the ‘defining’ properties of the items that populate their heterophenomenological worlds, we could reasonably propose that we had discovered what they were really talking about… And if we discovered that the real goings-on bore only a minor resemblance to the heterophenomenological items, we could reasonably declare that people were just mistaken in the beliefs they expressed (Dennett 1991: 85).

Although the sole recourse to fiction⁴ seems to bring Dennett’s theoretical positions closer to those maintained in postmodern philosophies, in which the frontiers between the fictional and the real appear somewhat blurry and objectivity as a mere metaphor, we are not to be deceived by that (Dennett is most certainly no Derrida!), for Dennett has defined his own work as advocating a ‘mild realism’ which actually strives for objectivity (cf. 2005). In fact, Dennett’s overt precautions are due to his distrust that folk-psychological views on experience can actually meet the standards and requirements of science. But this does not amount to denying those views found in folk psychology. Dennett does not neglect that there is a ‘what-it-is-like’ level of experience,⁵ but those seemings that populate the level of what it is like to be us, living and conscious human subjects, are to be treated “as denizens of a theoretical fiction, characters in the subject’s autobiographical novel, the default position of heterophenomenology until we do science” (Dennett 2007, 262). Heterophenomenology is, then, not a complete science of the mind, but a humble previous stance to that future science. And although Dennett’s precautionary measures might seem a bit too extreme, his ultimate goal is to get things right from the point of view of science. The resort to fiction is only momentary until we solve with enough certainty “[t]he problem of spanning the various explanatory gaps between the (first-)personal level and the subpersonal level of the natural sciences” (Dennett 2007, 268); a problem “about as difficult… as science — or philosophy — has ever faced” (idem), which Dennett does not put at the level of those pseudoproblems and ‘category mistakes’ he

⁴ Cf. the long section, ‘Why resort to fiction?’ in Dennett (2007), 254-263.
⁵ The founding paper on the ‘what-it-is-like’ level of experience is, of course, Nagel’s “What is it like to be a bat?” Cf. Nagel, (1974).
finds everywhere in the philosophy of mind that he has tried to cast out in his various works as demons possessing the body of theory.

Now, a thorough explanation of heterophenomenology requires first and foremost the recognition of its negative character, which can only be clarified along with its target of criticism: autophenomenology. This will be called later on, with Soldati, ‘naïve phenomenology.’ But it has to be granted that Dennett tends to be somewhat ambiguous with his definition of phenomenology. On the one hand, in some passages he simply denies that there is such a thing as phenomenology; for example, in the following passage from *Consciousness Explained*: “[…] While there are zoologists, there really are no phenomenologists: uncontroversial experts on the nature of the things that swim in the stream of consciousness” (1991, 44-45). But on the other hand, heterophenomenology appears sometimes as the salvation of the phenomenological tradition and its problems. This salvation implies, in Dennett’s words, to strip the phenomenological tradition of the ‘anti-naturalistic ideology’ that has somehow weighed it down in order to “salvage all the good ideas of Phenomenology and incorporate them into heterophenomenology” (Dennett 2007, 267).

This rather concessionary attitude towards phenomenological philosophy (that it has ‘good ideas’) is perhaps due to the occasion, for the text we are quoting, “Heterophenomenology Reconsidered” (2007), is a reply to a series of essays (edited by Alva Noë as a collective issue for the journal *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*), some of which were written by leading phenomenologists who signaled openly both Dennett’s arrogant misrepresentation of phenomenology and his notorious lack of familiarity with the object of his criticism, that is, the phenomenological tradition. Dennett has claimed, however, that he has gotten a certain familiarity with Husserlian phenomenology first as an undergraduate at Harvard with Føllesdal and then with his doctoral supervisor at Oxford, Gilbert Ryle, whom he credits as a masterful connoisseur of phenomenology (cf. Dennett 1994). In his response to

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6 Cf. Soldati (2007), 89-93, who contrasts ‘naïve phenomenology’ to ‘real existing phenomenology.’ It goes without saying that the latter amounts to the phenomenological European tradition of philosophy.

7 Husserl’s anti-naturalism is well-known, mainly because, according to his understanding, science and philosophy are not one and the same thing. In his programmatic writing *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (1910/1911), he has referred to the attempt at a theory of knowledge based on natural science as an absurdity (*Widersinn*). Cf. PsW, 299. A claim that a scientism à la Dennett would quickly disregard as a mere irrational obscurity.

8 A rather puzzling claim, by the way, to anyone acquainted with Ryle’s *The Concept of Mind* (1949):
Carr, a Husserl scholar who has translated *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* into English and who has been blurting out Dennett’s ignorance of phenomenology, he has asserted that “part of what I thought I learned from those early encounters is that reading the self-styled Husserlians was largely a waste of time; they were deeply into obscurantism for its own sake” (1994). Although Dennett has admitted he is not, strictly speaking, acquainted scholarly with the phenomenological tradition nor has kept up with the relevant literature (“If I can figure out at least most of it without having to subject myself to all that stuff, why should I bother raking through it for further good bits? Life is short”), he has quickly disregarded any accusation as to whether he has been involved in the suspicious attitude of bad reading habits and prejudice: “It is precisely because my disregard has not been complete that it has been, and continues to be, so confident” (*idem*).\(^9\)

However, Dennett’s capitalized use of ‘Phenomenology’ indicates as well that he distinguishes among various usages of the term. Among Dennett’s writings at least three kinds of phenomenology are to be found: (1) Capitalized ‘Phenomenology’ refers to the phenomenological tradition founded by Husserl in Germany and continued by other European philosophers such as Heidegger, Fink, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, etc. (2) Non-capitalized ‘phenomenology’ refers to the notional seemings of subjective character which are expressed in people’s beliefs about their experience. This is, by the way, a non-phenomenological usage of the term, because with it Dennett makes reference to a sort of ineffable private experience, a sort of reference to qualia; a term which technically (in analytical philosophy) means precisely the Nagelian ‘what-it-is-like’ level of experience along with those seemings that are part of undergoing that very experiential level. This second, non-capitalized, usage of the term is christened ‘autophenomenology’ by Dennett and, in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition of qualia, it refers to the mental states by means of which subjects are capable of having a private experiential level of what-it-is-like for them to be them, that is, subjects of those experiences, and to undergo experiences such as seeing colors, feeling pain and so on. This is, of

\(^9\) The point is, of course, if Dennett has figured out phenomenology pretty well, as he seems to think. Marbach, Zahavi, Dreyfus among other phenomenologists have repeatedly shown Dennett hasn’t. But still he does not seem to mind.
course, the target of criticism of the third kind of phenomenology, that is, (3) Dennettian heterophenomenology.

However, Dennett’s ambiguity remains and this distinction is not always respected. Along the way, phenomenology as defined in (1) and (2) seems to have been confused and the early characterization of autophenomenology as some sort of “introspectionist bit of mental gymnastics” (Dennett 1987, 153) that is known in the psychological tradition of Wundt, for example, has been thoroughly attributed by Dennett to phenomenological philosophy. According to this, in a widely cited passage which is now worth quoting at length, Dennett characterizes Phenomenology (with a capital P) as the philosophical school or movement that

[…] grew up early in the twentieth century around the work of Edmund Husserl. Its aim was to find a new foundation for all philosophy (indeed, for all knowledge) based on a special technique of introspection, in which the outer world and all its implications and presuppositions were supposed to be ‘bracketed’ in a particular act of mind known as the epoché. The net result was an investigative state of mind in which the Phenomenologist was supposed to become acquainted with the pure objects of conscious experience, called noemata, untainted by the usual distortions and amendments of theory and practice. Like other attempts to strip away interpretation and reveal the basic facts of consciousness to rigorous observation, such as the Impressionist movement in the arts and the Introspectionist psychologies of Wundt, Titchener, and others, Phenomenology has failed to find a single, settled method that everyone could agree upon (1991, 44).

In proclaiming the premature death of phenomenology, Dennett is not alone. In Being No One (2003), Thomas Metzinger, the Director of the Theoretical Philosophy Group at the University of Mainz and a leading neurophilosopher in Germany, has referred to phenomenology as an impossible theoretical endeavour: “You can take phenomenology seriously without running into all of its traditional problems” (2003, 591), which means: You can grant the existence of first-person experience, without resorting to phenomenological unsolved and largely obscure problems. What kind of problems is Metzinger talking about? Well, in the same Dennettian contra-autophenomenological spirit, Metzinger
goes on to affirm that “[f]irst-person access to the phenomenal content of one’s own mental states does not fulfill the defining criteria for the concept of ‘data.’ My politically incorrect conclusion therefore is that first-person data do not exist” (idem). Ergo, there really is no such thing as a true phenomenological philosophy and this is why Metzinger has gone so far as to affirm phenomenology’s bankruptcy and lack of scientific importance whatsoever: “[Phenomenology is] a discredited research program... intellectually bankrupt for at least 50 years” (1997, 385).10

In what follows, I shall take the time to dispute this rather puzzling definition of phenomenological philosophy as introspection resorting fundamentally to texts of Husserl and Heidegger, on the one hand, and to Dreyfus’ concept of phenomenological skillful coping, on the other. But my argumentative strategy will be twofold, because it wouldn’t be too ambitious to just correct a manifest misrepresentation of phenomenology, given that there is certainly an enormous amount of phenomenological texts that could be quoted against the backdrop of Dennett’s insistence that he has gotten it right. As a matter of fact, important phenomenologists such as Husserl, Heidegger, Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty have directly and publicly spoken against introspection as a fruitful philosophical endeavour and the most basic acquaintance with phenomenology would prove Dennett quite wrong on this regard.11

This strategy notwithstanding — that is, confronting Dennett’s suspicious understanding of phenomenology — has turned out to be quite ineffective since Dennett, true to his style and much to our dissatisfaction, has responded in his “Heterophenomenology Reconsidered” by naming a bunch of examples and telling stories.12 My alternative strategy, far from just comparing texts, would amount to assuming that the burden of proof lies at my side and that it would be far more effective and fruitful to phenomenologically go to the things

10 “What about the actual phenomenology?... There is no such thing.” Dennett (1991), 365.
11 “All the major figures in the phenomenological tradition have openly and unequivocally denied that they are engaged in some kind of introspective psychology and that the method they employ is a method of introspection”, Zahavi (2007), 28. Cf. for example, Gurwitsch (1966), 89–106; Heidegger (GA 58), 11–17; Husserl (Hua XXIV), 201–216; Merleau-Ponty (1945), 70.
12 Even though these reading contradictions are pretty straightforward, when Dennett has been directly accused of inaccurate reading or of simply ignoring phenomenology tout court, he has reacted with this rather disconcerting claim: “I have made it plain enough in The Intentional Stance (1978) and subsequent writings what my attitude is towards Husserl: I think I have got him right, and some Husserlians tend to agree (Dreyfus and Follesdal, if they count), but if not, then so much the worse for Husserl, since my version is the one that is worth defending” (1994).
themselves! By this is meant that what I actually deem more efficacious on this regard is nothing but giving an answer to Dennett’s own question, posed when discussing with Chalmers: “Is there anything about experience that is not explorable by heterophenomenology? I’d like to know what” (cf. 2001). And my answer will be sound: Yes there is! No less than the most basic non-theoretical, non-representational, embodied and embedded, human experience or coping, which is constantly neglected in Dennett’s sort of theory-theory of mind, according to which every form of experience is “a form of theorizing and experiential states such as emotions, perceptions, and intentions [are] theoretically postulated entities” (Zahavi 2007, 23). In short, we will have to show that, indeed, there is a dimension of experience which is not of theoretical nature and that theory arises out of this basic coping. Beliefs, which play a decisive role in Dennetian heterophenomenology as data of scientific inquiry, are not at all primary sources but secondary items of experience, as will be demonstrated along with Heidegger’s distinction between Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit (cf. SZ § 14 ff). Finally, it shall be shown that an ideology-driven misconception, that the young Heidegger designated as a general dominion or primacy of the theoretical (‘Generalherrschaft des Theoretischen’, ‘Primat des Theoretischen.’ Cf. GA 56/57), is to be held guilty for deforming the genuine phenomenological experience, which heterophenomenology, as a theory-theory of mind and generally as mere theory, leaves out of its field of research because unfortunately it does not even catch a glimpse of it.13

2. Autophenomenology or Naïve Phenomenology Against the Backdrop of Heterophenomenology

According to Dennett’s conception of worldly experience as a theorist’s fiction (1991: 78-81), phenomenology understood as autophenomenology obeys not to something completely false or utter farcical and it has to be acquiesced as a constituting dimension of everyday human practice. Nevertheless, even those private and intimate subjective experiences everybody claims to have stemming from the autophenomenological dimension, which constitute people’s folk

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13 On this regard, what motivates me is the young Heidegger’s insight of philosophy as atheoretical or the quest of such a conception of philosophy: “Die Frage nämlich, wie Philosophie möglich ist, ohne Theorie zu sein.” Figal (1996), 35. I have written elsewhere on this issue. Cf. my (2009), (2010) and (2011).
psychological views on their own worldly experience, must be submitted to a principle of ‘metaphysical minimalism’ which “begins by cautiously saying nothing at all about what consciousness might be, or even where it might be found” (1982: 159). Curiously enough, that is, for someone who claims to have gotten rid of the ‘Cartesian Theatre’ (cf. Dennet 1991, 101 ff.), all these precautionary measures resemble the ones once took by Descartes himself. Dennett echoes then the Cartesian leitmotiv of caution and doubt and the search for scientific clarity and distinction, for one could be deceived even in the most straightforward of perceptions. Indeed, it is to be acknowledged that often the apparently commonest of experiences are not always what we think they are and that certain aspects of those experiences would have remained unbeknownst to us forever, were it not for the commendable workings of scientific inquiry.

For Dennett, the counterpart of human experience is to be detected in its being expressed in beliefs and opinions of all sorts. This dimension has been traditionally conceived of as the subjective character of consciousness (for instance, in Descartes’ use of the first-person singular in his philosophical soliloquies, cf. Dennett 1991, 66), which by necessity involves the first-person point of view. I feel a certain physical disturbance or a feeling of discomfort, say, a head-ache, and it seems to me clearly and distinctly that it actually is a head-ache, for I believe it so and, not only that, I also feel it beyond a shadow of doubt! Who could be in the position to deny that I do have a head-ache? Aren’t I indisputably authoritative over my own feelings? Isn’t pain something distinctly private and untransferable? Although I pretend to have full authority over my own private experiences, Dennett warns us against this overt — and as of yet, non-proven albeit manifest — certitude; there is, indeed, a difference to be made between what is happening in me and what seems to be happening: “You are not authoritative about what is happening in you, but only about what seems to be happening in you, and we are giving you total, dictatorial authority over the account of how it seems to you” (1991, 96-97). For Dennett, this is precisely where one encounters the fundamental mistake of autophenomenology: in its gullible insistence that what seems to be happening in the private, subjective level of experience is to be given entire trust. As Soldati has argued, “[i]f

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14 As it is widely known, Dennett has replaced the Cartesian Theatre with the Multiple Drafts model of consciousness, according to which “all varieties of perception — indeed, all varieties of thought or mental activity — are accomplished in the brain by parallel, multitrack processes of interpretation and elaboration of sensory inputs” (1991), 111. The model is meant to eliminate Cartesian representations which would purportedly entertain a sort of internal, mindful audience.
experiences are seemings, then... the subject has privileged access to its own experiences” (2007, 95). Autophenomenological introspection acquires then a sort of infallible stance by means of which it can claim full authority over incorrigible and ineffable experiences. But, of course, no scientific endevour can be built upon people’s folk psychological views on their private experience, even by means of that misbegotten overgeneralization Dennett ascribes without let or hindrance to phenomenological philosophy, as we are about to witness.

Moreover, Dennett takes a further step and puts this autophenomenological introspection with its purported authoritative incorregibility at the same level of phenomenological philosophy, by ascribing to phenomenology a methodological search for inner life and private musings:

Perhaps when people first encounter the different schools of thought on phenomenology, they join the school that sounds right to them, and each school of phenomenological description is basically right about its own members’ sorts of inner life, and then just innocently overgeneralizes, making unsupported claims about how it is with everyone (1991, 67).

Again, Metzinger agrees almost verbatim with Dennett in ridiculing phenomenology for the absurd pretension of generating data from the mere invocation of first-person convictions; and this by arriving at conflicting statements such as the following:

“This is the purest blue anyone can perceive!” versus “No, it isn’t, it has a faint but perceptible trace of green in it!” or, “This conscious experience of jealousy shows me how much I love my husband!” versus “No, this emotional state is not love at all, it is a neurotic, bourgeois fear of loss!” (2003, 591).

In the same vein, Dennett reduces phenomenological experience and subjectivity to something merely private and ineffable, which, just like for Metzinger, would necessitate a foolish case for settling conflicting views,

15 It is perhaps understandable that someone does not feel any attraction whatsoever to phenomenological philosophy. But the sole suggestion that phenomenologists are frauds sharing inner mysterious feelings and naively overgeneralizing those introspections, seems like violating the most basic principle of charity that other philosophers — educated in a different philosophical tradition than the one one is acquainted with — are not plain stupid.
jeopardizing from the outset the scientific enterprise of arriving at intersubjective and public truths. This is, no wonder, why Dennett speaks constantly of personal phenomenologies: my phenomenology, your phenomenology, etc.; which would amount to everyone’s view on what it seems to them to be under a certain mental state of experiential affairs.

Anyhow, as asserted above, Dennett does not deny the existence of personal phenomenologies, or perhaps better construed from Dennettian jargon, autophenomenologies: “Am I saying we have absolutely no privileged access to our own conscious experience? No, but I am saying that we tend to think we are much more immune to error than we are” (1991, 68). There is something to be done with all these kinds of personal experiences we all seem to have and which populate our mindful beliefs and opinions. And this is where heterophenomenology comes to our aid, precisely in dealing with the problem of generating genuine scientific data which first and foremost appear to belong to the dominion of autophenomenological experiences. Thus, let me be clear, neither Dennett nor Metzinger, who prima facie seem pretty much at odds over which status to bestow upon first-person experiences, are willing to take autophenomenology off the list of problems which have to be dealt with when it comes to the issue of rendering a satisfactory account of human conscience. After all, the phenomenon according to which it seems to us that we are perceiving something, feeling pain and the like, exists, so it is not about denying it; instead it is about getting “all the heuristic power from first-person descriptions without being driven to naïve realistic assumptions and the stipulation of mysterious, nonpublic objects” (Metzinger 2003, 591). As Dennett has argued on his own account, the problem is not that people have these kinds of experiences but the attempt, doomed to failure, to strive for making a metaphysics out of those experiences and ascribing philosophical powers and quasi magical properties to them: “I deny that there are any such properties. But I agree wholeheartedly that there seem to be” (1991, 372). This is also the reason why Dennettian heterophenomenology enters the stage in order to salvage phenomenology, construed as autophenomenology, from its apparent Cartesian capsule. Heterophenomenology is then:

[T]he neutral path leading from objective physical science and its insistence on the third-person point of view, to a method of phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most
private and ineffable subjective experiences, while never abandoning the methodological scruples of science (Dennett 1991, 72).

It is, after all, a method. In which way does it proceed? Let us remind ourselves that the modest goal Dennett had set himself from the start with heterophenomenology was meant as the beginning of a science and not its end: “it is the organization of the data, a catalogue of what must be explained, not itself an explanation of a theory… And in maintaining this neutrality, it is actually doing justice to the first-person perspective” (2003, 27). Dennett’s theoretical scruples are meant to redeem all those mental states we commonly associate with the first-person perspective for the purposes of scientific inquiry by submitting them to a concrete and objective method. Dennett presupposes wholeheartedly that by means of paying heed to isolated subjects’ reports — isolated inasmuch as they are reporting about certain phenomena they are confronted with in laboratory-rat-like environments specially designed for that purpose — the scientists dealing with consciousness could in principle arrive at reliable conclusions about mental phenomena subjects claim to experience.

So this is how it goes: in order for mental phenomena to overcome their insusceptibility to scientific inquiry, subjects’ beliefs about these phenomena must be submitted as reports which, on the other hand, can be categorized by the heterophenomenologist. The heterophenomenologist must maintain her neutrality at all times, that is, she does not judge whether any subject’s reports are to be assessed as illusory, imaginary or whatever. It is not, for Dennett, that these heterophenomenological reports are about some outer data, which later on could magically find a consciousness correlate. Dennett is not interested in what the *seemings* of those reports are about, but in the reports themselves. The reports, in fact, are the data that have to be scientifically explicated: “the primary data are the utterances, the *raw*, uninterpreted data” (Dennett 2003, 21). Thus, the heterophenomenologist goes on to render an account of these reports and utterances which, at least for the time being, are equivalent to pretheoretical data, and subsequently — that is, when finally interpreted heterophenomenologically — they will form the body of categories constituting the heterophenomenological world.

As we may suppose, a catalogue of beliefs — albeit carefully interpreted — is as of yet not a constituent of a well-developed science. This explains perhaps Dennett’s insistence in resorting to fiction. For let us remember that Dennett’s
treatment of beliefs from the intentional stance as theorists’ fictions (cf. 1971, 1987 and 1991) is part of the so-called neutrality of heterophenomenology. Heterophenomenological reports get to be believed as if they were part of a fictional world. But that does not mean they are plainly false. Actually, “[t]he subjective world is not to be confused with the real world, but that does not mean that it is not by and large composed of truths” (Dennett 2007, 262). As there are most certainly truths in fiction, some of those heterophenomenological reports might turn out to be accurate someday, when brain mapping allowed to match people’s folk psychological views with real goings-on in the brain. But until now, Dennett suggests extreme caution.

Now, what is left for phenomenological philosophy is perhaps a modest contribution, which could eventually enrich “the vocabulary of the personal level…, teasing out aspects of the patterns of competences, inabilities, needs and methods of persons in illuminating ways, but this is all just setting the specs — the competence model — for the subpersonal level account of how the performances are achieved” (Dennett 2007, 256-257). But is this really all there is for phenomenology to contribute to the science of mind? I think otherwise and will take a closer look at this in the next section of this paper.

3. Phenomenological Skillful Coping

What do we get from contrasting real existing phenomenology (cf. Soldati 2007) with this sort of sui generis Dennettian autophenomenology? Not only, as I would like to demonstrate, a quite distinguishable philosophical enterprise from this far-fetched and extravagant overgeneralization out of intimate, ineffable musings Dennett ascribes to phenomenological philosophy, but above all a whole dimension of experience which is altogether left unattended on behalf of heterophenomenology’s neutrality and recourse to beliefs as data.

But first, let us get things straight from the phenomenological point of view as regards introspection. Is it accurate to vindicate phenomenology as a method “based on a special technique of introspection” (Dennett 1991, 44)? Is it true that phenomenology has been committed to a form of “methodological solipsism” (Dennett 1987, 154)? In a nutshell, is phenomenology plain

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autophenomenology? For anyone even slightly familiar with the phenomenological tradition, the answer to these questions has to be an emphatic ‘no,’ if by phenomenology one understands the classical phenomenological movement founded by Husserl and its ensuing contemporary heritage. As Zahavi and others have argued in several places (2007, 2008 and Gallagher & Zahavi 2010), the claims according to which phenomenological philosophy would amount to such introspectionism — in spite of Dennett’s own claim of allegedly having gotten everything right even without reading! — only end up revealing “one’s lack of familiarity with the tradition in question” (Zahavi 2007, 28; Gallagher & Zahavi 2010, 21).

Husserl himself, to be sure, has rejected in more than one occasion the anodyne confusion between inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung) and phenomenological perception (phänomenologische Wahrnehmung) (cf. Hua XXIV, 216). In Ideen III, precisely when discussing a contemporary misrepresentation of phenomenology that Husserl conceived of as superficial (oberflächlich) and preposterous (grundverkehrt), he attacks the view that phenomenology could be assessed as the “Restitution der Methode innerer Beobachtung,” that is, as the restitution of the method of introspection, which would be supposedly in charge of “direkte innere Erfahrung” or direct inner experience (Hua V, 38). And not only that: The very point of departure of phenomenology in Husserl’s breakthrough work, Logische Untersuchungen (1900-1901), was precisely a call to abandon the dichotomy (Scheidung) between inner and outer perceptions, which Husserl associated with a naïve commonsensical metaphysics left behind with the concept of intentionality (cf. Hua XIX/2, 673). But again, as Zahavi reminds us, this facile divide between inside and outside “is precisely something that the term ‘introspection’ buys into and accepts” because “to speak of introspection is to (tacitly) endorse the idea that consciousness is inside the head and the world outside” (2007, 29). So introspection is from the very outset anti-phenomenological! In the same sense, Heidegger has severe words against a conception of an encapsulated Dasein (verkapselt) striving to abandon a purported inner sphere in order to reach the outside world (SZ § 13, 62). For both founding figures of phenomenology, such

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17 Another sense of phenomenology, precisely the one which resonates candidly in Dennett, is to be found in recent philosophy of mind when it is “often restricted to the characterization of sensory qualities of seeing, hearing, etc.: what it is like to have sensations of various kinds.” Woodruf-Smith (2008). This non-phenomenological use of the term by Dennett is most likely a Rylean heritage.
a view dividing clumsily reality has its roots in the ‘natural attitude’ (natürliche Haltung in Husserl) or in the primacy of the theoretical (Vorherrschaft des Theoretischen in the young Heidegger); both of which signal the same phenomenon of great interest to phenomenology, inasmuch as phenomenology investigates the origin of theory and abstraction and its roots in the life-world.

But shouldn’t we judge phenomenology as a rather odd undertaking, especially from the point of view of method? Dennett has referred to phenomenological epoché as a special technique “in which the outer world and all its implications and presuppositions were supposed to be ‘bracketed’ in a particular act of mind” (1991, 44). Well, isn’t that just an obscure procedure that annuls reality, objectivity and, even worse, science? Maybe this explains pretty well Dennett’s assessment of Husserlians as self-styled obscurantists involved deeply into abstruseness for its own sake (cf. 1994), but if by epoché one understands an exclusion of reality, a sort of repudiation of reality or, so to say, an irrational cancelation of objectivity, then we are dealing here with a quite flawed and non-phenomenological definition of epoché. The bracketing of phenomenological epoché is an attempt to cope with the natural attitude pervading even science. Moreover, science did not descend from heaven in a pure manner, but is the result of certain historical experiences which phenomenology has cared to investigate in depth.18

The transcendental stance often, and correctly, attributed to phenomenology has to do with the fact that it understands itself not only contributing to the growth of scientific knowledge and its positive results, because first and foremost it is interested, as a philosophical endeavour, in the basis of human knowledge and its conditions of possibility. So, from a phenomenological standpoint, even science cannot be taken for granted; even science gets to be phenomenologically questioned. The world exists without the shadow of the slightest doubt and, in conjunction with phenomenological epoché, the phenomenologist won’t deny that. But what is interesting and really worth reflecting upon, as Husserl thought rigorously, is to comprehend this indubitability and clarify its legitimacy (cf. Hua V, 152-153). So, pace Dennett, here it is a phenomenological definition of epoché: it is a technical term that refers to the suspension of the natural, realistic, and unrigorous inclination to take the world for granted, with the subsequent aim, not to neglect or exclude

18 Cf., for example, Husserl’s superb work on this topic (Hua VI).
reality, but of neutralizing a certain dogmatic attitude towards reality, thereby allowing us to focus on sense, that is, on the meaningfulness of the world, as given in experience.\textsuperscript{19} What is excluded, as a result of epoché, is most certainly a dogmatic naïvety; but this naïvety is even very important for science, whose theoretical mission is taking things as objects. But again, objectivity is everything but natural, for it is rather a by-product of certain historical experiences, above all, of intentionality. As Hans Blumenberg has handsomely defined it, Husserlian intentionality is the special mark of conscience; and the latter meanwhile can be understood, not as something merely mental, encapsulated in people’s brains, but as a historical and productive structure (\textit{Leistungstruktur}), striving for completion and comprehensive goals (\textit{Zielstrebigkeit}) (Blumenberg 2009, 18). Let us look at this in depth:

The intentional character of conscience fulfills itself ultimately in the most all-encompassing horizon of horizons, in the ‘world’ as the most regulatory idea of possible experience. […] ‘Nature’ as well is the result of a certain conceptual sharpness and this is why it is to be held as a by-product of, and not as originary as, the world (Blumenberg 2009, 19).\textsuperscript{20}

What is worth keeping in mind, anyway, is that phenomenology, whatever its themes and interests, is not looking for a turn to inwardness or for a mental introspectionist encapsulation. On the contrary, it is the world and the meaningful structures that constitute this horizon of all horizons what phenomenology attempts to investigate. Be that as it may, phenomenology remains an investigation of reality and not of private, ineffable seemings. And that should be clear for anyone acquainted with the phenomenological tradition.

Now, it is time to return back to Dennett’s heterophenomenology, which — we must concur at this point — has very little to do with phenomenology and perhaps does not deserve its remaining even as suffix in the name ‘heterophenomenology.’\textsuperscript{21} Dennett’s extreme caution has not prevented him

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\item \textsuperscript{19} I’m following here Zahavi’s definition. See 2007, 30.
\item \textsuperscript{20} My translation from the German.
\item \textsuperscript{21} “Given that Dennett is committed to the view that there are neither other subjects (since there are no real subjects in the first place) nor any real phenomenology, one might ultimately ask whether his position really deserves the name heterophenomenology. Let me conclude by suggesting that a more fitting label might be nemophenomenology, or if we want to keep it Greek, outisphenomenology.” Zahavi (2007), 40.
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from precisely, and contrary to his own intentions, not doing justice to subjective experience and overlooking central aspects of it. And this is what one gets when one assumes that beliefs could count as originary and not — as it should be — as merely derived from experience. But, of course, as phenomenologists, we should not expect this to be a dogma, as it is the belief that beliefs should occupy the place Dennett ascribes to them. On the contrary, it should be phenomenologically evident and not sheer stipulation by fiat. Indeed, phenomenology means basically this: Nothing can be made up. Contrariwise, for Dennett, “[s]ubjective, then, are those experiences that are only the object of a belief” (Soldati 2007, 96) and these are the only experiences Dennett, as heterophenomenologist, is willing to accept. But is this the case? Aren’t there a whole bunch of experiences, perhaps the most of them, which do not require our having a belief about them, not even an opinion on them? Do we really act upon beliefs and theoretical motivations of a certain kind, say, unconscious ones?

Dreyfus and Kelly (cf. 2007) have objected that Dennett adds something to certain experiences that is not there to begin with, that is, belief, and that heterophenomenological reports are all tainted with this surrogate. By means of resorting to what Merleau-Ponty has called ‘solicitation’ (cf. 1945) and the psychologist J. J. Gibson, ‘affordance’ (cf. 1977), Dreyfus and Kelly retort to Dennett’s unfounded claim that beliefs are the first stance from which subjective experience can be in principle investigated. In fact, there are numerous experiences in which, not only beliefs are missing, but actually depend on the absence of beliefs. It is the case of what Dreyfus has called for decades skillful-coping, or sometimes absorbed or embedded coping. According to this, “[a]ffordances draw activity out of us only in those circumstances in which we are not paying attention to the activity they solicit” (Dreyfus & Kelly 2007, 52). In effect, when illustrating the occasion in which one feels compelled to step back to look from a better angle at a picture in a museum, Dreyfus and Kelly go on to explicate:

[I]t is an essential aspect of my experience of the picture not just that I am

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22 This is, indeed, my way of interpreting Husserl’s famous Prinzip aller Prinzipien. Cf. Husserl (Hua III) § 24, 52.

as a matter of fact a certain distance from it, or even that I am too close to it, but rather that I am immediately compelled to step back from it. This compulsion to act is incompatible with the nature of belief. I could believe that I am too close to the painting while feeling no particular need to do anything about it. I could even believe that the picture is soliciting me to back away from it while having nothing of the phenomenology of repulsion. Beliefs tell me how the world is, or what the features of my experience of it are. But it is one thing to report that there is a tension, and quite another to experience it as such (2007, 54).

This same kind of absence of belief in experience was first developed by the young Heidegger in his very first lecture as scientific assistant of Husserl in Freiburg in 1919, in which he famously asserted: “Es weltet!” (GA 56/57, 73). In originary experience, which could be better called Erlebnis, not only I often do not behave fundamentally moved by beliefs, let along by reflections upon unworldly things. Things appear to me, rather than as objects, as soliciting certain affordances of my own: My desk is too close to me, I should move it a little bit. It is too dark in here, I need more illumination, and so on. Things, which at this point of experience are not merely theoretical objects, are meaningful from the start and we do not ascribe meaning to them by means of beliefs or, as Heidegger would say, meaningfulness comes first (“das Bedeutsame ist das Primäre,” GA 56/57, 72-73). But this is no concession to irrationality. That worldly things are first and foremost ready-to-hand (zuhanden) and appear at my disposal rather than before my inquisitive theoretical eyes (vorhanden) as objects of a merely theoretical attitude, does not imply this atheoretical level of experience is blind, for it has its certain gaze, which Heidegger has called circumspection (‘Umsicht,’ SZ § 15, 69).

It is precisely our non-contemplative attitude towards things which appear in experience, which allows us to cope with them. Coping, the non-theoretical know-how of the Erlebnis, does not depend on taking things objectively or on reporting about them a posteriori. As Dreyfus and Kelly have argued, we could report later on on our experience but that does not constitute the experience itself (cf. 2007, 54). Quite the opposite, it is because we are not involved in theorizing that things turn out well on many occasions. Actually, one does not pay attention to things as objects until something breaks down or, according to Heidegger, until the references of their ‘towards-which’ are interrupted, that is to
say, until the door, for instance, no longer functions right, it appears to me as an object, and now with broken properties which have to be restored. The equipmental character of things implies that “they are not to be interpreted as bare Thinghood presented for an apprehension of what is just present-at-hand and no more” (SZ § 17, 81). The problem with belief is that it objectifies from the outset and takes things as mere thinghood, because reporting on them is a matter of not being absorbed by a certain situation. As Dreyfus suggests: “[W]hen we are pressing into possibilities, there is no experience of an entity doing the soliciting; just the solicitation. Such solicitations disclose the world on the basis of which we sometimes do step back and perceive things as things” (2007, 253). That meaningfulness comes first implies that what is first of all given is the “for writing,” the “for going in and out,” the “for illuminating,” the “for sitting” (Heidegger GA 21, 144), and not first and foremost objects and properties, let alone objective processes. Affordances and solicitations constituting absorbed coping give us a glimpse of what things are in experience to begin with: Possibilities for action and never objective things with fixed properties discovered by the mind. The ‘knowledge’ which comprises this originary dimension of experience has nothing to do with an epistemological stance, neither relating subjective reports with objective data nor with cerebral correlates. It is, contrariwise, understanding in all its existential potential as the possibility that Dasein is to itself.

Careful description of the meaningful dimensions of the life-world (Husserl) or of existential understanding (Heidegger) constitutes the task of phenomenological investigation. But this meaningfulness given in experience or this existential understanding, which gives form to our genuine way of ‘knowing,’ is not mental at all, let alone introspectionistic: “This ‘knowing’ does not first arise from an immanent self-perception but belongs to the Being of the ‘there,’ which is essentially understanding. And only because Dasein, in understanding, is its there, can it go astray and fail to recognize itself” (Heidegger SZ § 31, 144. Emphasis added). The conception of human being as anthropos — as a thing among other things — and not as Dasein, confirms this going astray, which fails at the recognition of itself.

4. Finale: Can Phenomenological Philosophy Contribute to the Scientific Study of Mind?
Phenomenology’s task of describing these meaningful structures of experience is, no doubt, very modest. But it is essential. This is why we endorse the opinion according to which “it ought to be obvious that phenomenology has a lot to say in the area called philosophy of mind” (Smith 2003). It is a lot better, for starters, to commence with a rigorous description of pretheoretical experience, than by simply doing so by commonsensical approaches, which is unfortunately the case in many contemporary theories of mind. And Dennett’s belief according to which beliefs are to be taken as data stems from assuming without question that the theoretical attitude is to be granted some sort of primacy in experience. In short, Dennett is bewitched by a certain species of scientism and along with it by the contemporary sort — so typical from the second half of the 20th century to our days — one could name cognitivism.

In addition, there seems to be an inadmissible rejection of perception in Dennettian heterophenomenological musings. As Husserl construed it, when he demanded paying a great deal of heed to it in his Prinzip aller Prinzipien (cf. Hua III § 24, 52), perceptive experience is to be given a paradigmatic stance. To begin with abstraction in order to explicate meaningfulness is a no starter for phenomenology, because even objectivity derives its legitimacy from an intentional understanding which precisely allows the taking of things as objects. In the same vein, supposing beliefs are to be bestowed with originariness begs the question, for here we are assuming without proof what is to be proven. Actually, a great part of absorbed-coping, that is, worldly perceptive (circumspective) experience, requires a certain inconspicuousness (Unauffälligkeit, Heidegger SZ § 16, 75), by means of which absorbed coping and thematization become opposites. That is to say, when being absorbed, nothing can become a theme for circumspection, because circumspectively perceiving amounts to understanding a certain situation non-thematically. And imposing belief à la Dennett by sheer fiat, that is, not phenomenologically, as the first stance in the investigation of subjectivity, presupposes actually what it has to prove: whether verbal thematization (judgment, in that old logical designation) and circumspective absorbed coping are to be conceived on the basis of the former’s primacy over the latter or conversely. Phenomenology does

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24 Other critical phenomenological tasks, as the ones pertaining the explanation of the origin of theory and abstraction and the heinous consequences of science’s independence from the life-world and the blindness deriving thereof, are also essential, but not so modest.
not annul objectivity but construes it as a *terminus ad quem*, not as *terminus a quo*. As resulting by-products of pretheoretical experience, objectivity and abstraction do not stand on their own feet and can never render an account of themselves, for they belong to the meritorious, albeit constantly overlooked, workings of circumspective perception. And the same counts for thematical beliefs. They appear when obviousness in the life-world is interrupted by malfunction, which demands immediately a theoretical and thematic treatment of the situation.

But yet when stressing the importance of phenomenological philosophy for the science of mind I am fortunately not alone. Dennett’s claims as to how his heterophenomenological method is the way cognitive science works has not been unanimously accepted by all practitioners of cognitive science and more and more phenomenology is being taken seriously as a crucial option in the new studies of the mind, under the sigh of fresh air that can be found in the new approaches to cognitive science (the so called 4EA approaches: embodied, embedded, extended, enacted, affective). Alva Noë’s *Out of Our Heads. Why You Are Not Your Brain and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness* (2009), whose main goal is criticizing the unquestioned but highly questionable presuppositions of cognitive science (like the common orthodoxy: the mind is an information processing system, a representational device and in some sense a computer, cf. the preface to the Blackwell *Companion to Cognitive Science*, edited by Bechtel and Graham), is a good example that one can be both scientifically well-informed without, at the same time, ignoring—as if one could simply afford it—the contributions of phenomenological philosophy.

On the back cover of Noë’s superb work, Dennett has referred to it as a “provocative and insightful book that will force experts and students alike to reconsider their grasp of current orthodoxy. Those of us who disagree with some of its main conclusions have our work cut out for us”. We will keep waiting for an answer. For now, Dennett’s case against phenomenological philosophy remains highly unconvincing.

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